There are various kinds of rules that we follow in life. Rules of traffic, rules of discipline, rules of games, etiquette rules, rules of family life, rules of relationships etc. Is there anything in common in those rules that propels us to call all of them 'rules' ? Or again, is there any one thing common, in games for instance, due to which we call them all games? Our 'philosophical tendency' is to say that there 'must be' something common in all of them due to which we call them 'games'. This is the result of just blindly 'thinking' without 'looking'. When we closely examine them, we discover that all of them are called 'rules' or 'games' as the case may be due to 'family resemblances' among them and not due to any one thing common to all. Since it is possible to interpret a rule in different ways, interpretation of rule is not the way to grasp a rule. The way of grasping a rule without interpretation is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. Thus we may restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. "And hence also 'obeying a rule is a practice. And to 'think' one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it". (Ludwig Wittgenstein, P.I., para. 202).
Thinking about games, is it possible for two people to invent a game that is never played by anyone nor is it going to be played by anyone? Are the rules of the game just in the minds of these two individuals without depending on any custom or technique? If the rules are only in their minds, will they, just the two individuals , be able to agree on the rules? Will they able to decide what is according to the rules and what is against them? Will they be able to make the right moves in a game, say, like chess? Whatever each one thinks would be right for that person and they wouldn't be able to make any move and the game collapses like a house of cards. This shows that a game with its rules should have the background support of a custom, a technique of playing the game of chess for these individuals to play it. The same is true of language with its rules of use, which presupposes the common behavior of people in a society that stands as the point of reference for language use. "Language is a labyrinth of paths. you approach from 'one' side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." (Wittgenstein, P.I., para. 203).
There should be certain amount of constancy, regularity in the use of rules in language as elsewhere. That is why we can teach rules to others who don't know them by training them where mere explanations may not be enough. Explanations may be interpreted and interpreted wrongly defeating the purpose of conveying ideas through concepts.Training to understand a concept has the advantage of acting it out by the teacher so that the concept is accurately conveyed. Here again, mere examples will not serve the purpose unless one knows how to apply them in what ways to do it in the concrete instances. Pointing to an object and calling out its name, called 'ostensive definition' has a limited role, for example, in teaching children. Since any 'ostensive definition' can be misunderstood, that cannot be considered as the final court of appeal to explain and clarify concepts and their meanings. "Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different from that which 'points beyond' them."(P.I., para. 208).
Thinking about games, is it possible for two people to invent a game that is never played by anyone nor is it going to be played by anyone? Are the rules of the game just in the minds of these two individuals without depending on any custom or technique? If the rules are only in their minds, will they, just the two individuals , be able to agree on the rules? Will they able to decide what is according to the rules and what is against them? Will they be able to make the right moves in a game, say, like chess? Whatever each one thinks would be right for that person and they wouldn't be able to make any move and the game collapses like a house of cards. This shows that a game with its rules should have the background support of a custom, a technique of playing the game of chess for these individuals to play it. The same is true of language with its rules of use, which presupposes the common behavior of people in a society that stands as the point of reference for language use. "Language is a labyrinth of paths. you approach from 'one' side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." (Wittgenstein, P.I., para. 203).
There should be certain amount of constancy, regularity in the use of rules in language as elsewhere. That is why we can teach rules to others who don't know them by training them where mere explanations may not be enough. Explanations may be interpreted and interpreted wrongly defeating the purpose of conveying ideas through concepts.Training to understand a concept has the advantage of acting it out by the teacher so that the concept is accurately conveyed. Here again, mere examples will not serve the purpose unless one knows how to apply them in what ways to do it in the concrete instances. Pointing to an object and calling out its name, called 'ostensive definition' has a limited role, for example, in teaching children. Since any 'ostensive definition' can be misunderstood, that cannot be considered as the final court of appeal to explain and clarify concepts and their meanings. "Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different from that which 'points beyond' them."(P.I., para. 208).
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